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All attorneys who practice in the federal courts come into contact
with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They cannot es-
cape it, because Rule 4 governs the service of a summons and com-
plaint in federal civil actions. Effective February 26, 1983, Congress
changed Rule 4 in significant ways,' causing new difficulties for the
courts. Many of the difficulties were anticipated by commentators at
the time of the amendment 2 and will continue to be problematic un-
less the Rule is clarified. This essay will examine one facet of the 1983
amendments-the addition of service by first-class mail-and some of
its attendant problems. As will be seen, this discussion will require us
to delve into other parts of the 1983 amendments of Rule 4, because
the problems often stem from the interaction among other sections of
the Rule.
A major goal of the 1983 amendments was to remove from United
* Associate Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law. A.B., 1975,
Princeton University; J.D., 1978, New York University.
1. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96
Stat. 2527 (1983).
2. See generally Siegel, Practice Commentary on Amendment of Federal Rule 4
(Fff. Feb. 26,1983) with Special Statute of Limitations Precautions, 96 F.R.D. 81,
88 (1983).
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States Marshals the primary responsibility for serving the summons
and complaint on federal defendants.3 In its place, the amended Rule
makes the litigants responsible for arranging service of the summons
and complaint by allowing service to be made by any nonparty adult.4
To lower the expense of service for litigants, the Advisory Committee
and the Supreme Court proposed to allow service by certified or regis-
tered mail.5 Congress, though endorsing the concept of mail service,
altered the Supreme Court's proposal in favor of one modeled after
California law that allows service by first-class mail with the person
being served to return an acknowledgment form as evidence of
service.6
3. Under old Rule 4(c) process was to be served by a marshal, unless the court ap-
pointed someone to make service. According to the rule, "[s]pecial appointments
... shall be made freely." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c) (1982). In addition, anyone author-
ized by state law to serve process could serve federal process.
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2)(A).
5. Such service would be in addition to personal service or service on a responsible
person residing at home. However, it would have supplanted any state mail ser-
vice method.
Rule 4(d)(8) as proposed by the Supreme Court provided:
(8) Service of a summons and complaint upon a defendant of any class
referred to in paragraph (1) or (3) of this subdivision of this rule may be
made by the plaintiff or by any person authorized to serve process pursu-
ant to Rule 4(c), including a United States marshal or his deputy, by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested and delivery re-
stricted to the addressee. Service pursuant to this paragraph shall not be
the basis for the entry of a default or a judgment by default unless the
record contains a return receipt showing acceptance by the defendant or
a returned envelope showing refusal of the process by the defendant. If
delivery of the process is refused, the person serving the process,
promptly upon the receipt of notice of such refusal, shall mail to the
defendant by first class mail a copy of the summons and complaint and a
notice that despite such refusal the case will proceed and that judgment
by default will be rendered against him unless he appears to defend the
suit. Any such default will be rendered against him unless he appears to
defend the suit. Any such default or judgment by default shall be set
aside pursuant to Rule 55(c) or Rule 60(b) if the defendant demonstrates
to the court that the return receipt was signed or delivery was refused by
an unauthorized person.
93 F.R.D. 255, 256-57 (1982).
6. The path of the 1983 amendments was unusual. The Advisory Committee pro-
posed amendments to the rule which were then promulgated by the Supreme
Court. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 116-17 (Appendix A -Congressional Record, a
reprint of the relevant legislative history of the amendment.) Usually, such
amendments become law without action by Congress. However, these amend-
ments aroused such criticism that Congress voted on August 2, 1982, to postpone
the effective date of the amendments (originally August 1, 1982) until October 1,
1983, in order to take its own look at the Rule. Pub. L. No. 97-227, 96 Stat. 246
(1982). Actually, the postponement did not take effect until a day after the pro-
posed amendments became effective. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 92. Following
that review, Congress passed its own amendments to the rule, Pub. L. No. 97-462,
96 Stat. 2527, which became effective on February 26, 1983. For a complete dis-
cussion of the process of amending Rule 4, see generally Siegel, supra note 2;
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Though the goal of an inexpensive and effective method of service
is laudable, the lacunae of the amended Rule have led to numerous
disputes in reported cases7 about the efficacy of mail service in partic-
ular circumstances.
The disputes range over almost all facets of the Rule.8 However,
this essay will focus primarily on three issues that arise in most of the
cases: (1) When is service deemed "made" by mail? (2) Can mail ser-
vice be used if the defendant does not reside within the state in which
the district court sits? (3) If mail service is used and the defendant
fails to acknowledge service, what other procedures does the Rule al-
low a plaintiff to use to notify the defendant of the pending action?9
As noted already, these difficulties are not surprising. In a com-
mentary written just after the amendments were passed, Professor
David Siegel anticipated these very issuesO and has also authored
practice commentaries on the Rule in the United States Code Anno-
tatedi which illustrate the continuing division of courts on these is-
sues. The purpose of this essay is to develop these issues and suggest
solutions, either by rational interpretation of the Rule or by amend-
ment to the Rule.
I. WHEN SERVICE IS DEEMED MADE
This question is important in three situations, two of which are re-
lated. First, a defendant generally has twenty days to answer a com-
plaint. The period begins to run "after the service of the summons
and complaint upon that defendant." 2 Thus, when service is "made"
governs the defendant's time to respond.
Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serving Pro-
cess Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1197-1212 (1987); Jarvis &
Melhman, Rule 4(c) (2) (C) (ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: From Hap-
less to Hopeless, 61 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1, 4-7 (1986); Walker, The 1983 Amend-
ments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4-Process, Jurisdiction, and Erie
Principles Revisited, 19 WAKE FOREsT L. REv. 957, 960-62 (1983); Note, Service of
Process by First-Class Mail Under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
15 RuTGERs L.J. 993, 996-1001 (1984).
7. As of February 1988, a search in the WESTLAW database of "4(c)(2)(C)(ii)" pro-
duced over 150 cases. Many were unreported in the regular West reporter
service.
8. See, e.g., Jarvis & Mellman, supra note 6.
9. The latter sometimes becomes entangled with the first problem, as will be seen.
There is also a fourth issue that is not often raised, but is seen occasionally-the
interaction of mail service with Rule 6(e), .which allows three extra days to re-
spond when any "paper" is served by mail. The California statute on which Rule
4 is modeled answers this issue for that state. It says that mail service does not
extend the time to answer. CAT Crv. PROC. CODE § 413.20 (West 1973).
10. Siegel, supra note 2.
11. Siegel, Practice Commentaries on FRCP Rule 4, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, 28 U.S.C.A. 21
(West Supp. 1988) [hereinafter Practice Commentaries].
12. FED. & Crv. P. 12(a).
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Second, in New York, for example, the statute of limitations tolls
when service is made on the defendant, not when the action is filed.13
Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,14 a
federal court in a diversity action is bound to follow state law on this
issue.15 Thus, if service by mail is attempted near the end of the stat-
ute of limitations period, the plaintiff is at great risk, particularly if
the defendant receives the notice but deliberately fails to acknowledge
it.
Third, one of the 1983 amendments added Rule 4(j) which allows a
plaintiff 120 days from filing to serve the summons and complaint.
Thereafter, unless the plaintiff shows good cause to extend this time
limit, the action "shall be dismissed" without prejudice. 16 When is ser-
vice deemed "made" for the purposes of this rule? The application of
this rule can have serious consequences. If the statute of limitations
was tolled on filing, but the limitations period runs out before service
is "made," and the action is dismissed after the 120-day period allowed
for service under Rule 4(j), the plaintiff may not be able to refile the
suit.17
These issues have divided the courts, particularly the statute of
limitations issues.' 8 Unfortunately, there is little in the legislative his-
tory to use as guidance in resolving them. At the time the amend-
ments were considered by the House of Representatives, Congressman
Edwards of California, the principal sponsor of the bill, made a
lengthy statement setting forth his views on the intended operation of
each section of the amended Rule.19 However, there appear to be no
other significant statements by the legislators on the matter.20 Fur-
thermore, though modeled on the California statute, Rule 4 omits cru-
cial features that would aid in the answer to these problems.
The California statute contains a provision that addresses many of
these questions. The mail service provision of the California Code of
13. N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 203(b)l (McKinney 1972).
14. 446 U.S. 740 (1980). Oklahoma, the subject of Walker, has changed its statute and
now tolls the statute of limitations on filing. OKi-A. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2003
(West 1988). Kansas, whose statute was construed in Ragan v. Merchants Trans-
fer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), amended its statute to provide that the
limitations period tolls at the time of filing if service is obtained within a specified
period of time. KAN. CIV. PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-203 (Vernon 1984).
15. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751-52 (1980).
16. FED. R. Crv. P. 4(j).
17. Wei v. Hawaii, 763 F.2d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1985).
18. Compare Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984)(service by mail
effective on receipt) with Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., 800 F.2d 53 (3d Cir.
1986)(service by mail not effective if not acknowledged, unless follow-up service
is made); see also Guth v. Andersen, 118 F.R.D. 502, 503 (ND. Cal. 1988) (collect-
ing cases).
19. Reprinted in Siegel, supra note 2; see also Sinclair, supra note 6, at 1197-1212.
20. See Sinclair, supra note 6, at 1206-12.
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Civil Procedure provides in part: "Service of a summons pursuant to
this section [by mail, with an acknowledgment form to be returned by
the defendant] is deemed complete on the date a written acknowledg-
ment of receipt of summons is executed, if such acknowledgement
thereafter is returned to the sender."2 ' The statute further provides
that if the mail service is not acknowledged, the plaintiff must use
another method of service and the defendant ordinarily must pay the
costs. 2 2
Rule 4 does not have a provision that defines when service of a
summons is deemed complete. Therefore, when presented with the
issue, the federal courts must somehow divine the answer on their
own. Not surprisingly, the cases in the district courts and courts of
appeals are not united in an answer. Part of the difficulty may be the
courts' assumption that the answer must be the same for all situations.
Thus, a sympathetic decision in one area leads to unfortunate conclu-
sions in another. Conversely, a reasonable result in one situation is
unduly harsh in another. The better method is to examine each of the
three situations separately. As will be shown, it is not inconsistent
with the Rule or logic to have more than one answer to the question
"when is service deemed made."
A. When Service is Made for Statute of Limitations Purposes
The major jurisdiction where this is an issue is New York. New
York law requires that service be made before the statute of limita-
tions is tolled.23 The Second Circuit addressed the problem of federal
mail service and the statute of limitations in its much criticized deci-
sion, Morse v. Elmira Country Club.24 In Morse, a diversity action, the
plaintiff attempted to use mail service near the end of the statute of
limitations period. Although the summons and complaint were re-
ceived by the defendant prior to the end of the limitations period, the
defendant never returned the acknowledgment form. Two months
later, after the limitations time had run, the plaintiff served the de-
fendant personally.25 The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that
New York law required that service be effected prior to the end of the
limitations period.26 Because Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) requires a follow-up
service if the mail service is not acknowledged, the defendant argued
21. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 415.30(C) (West 1973).
22. Id. § 415.30(d).
23. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 203(a) (McKinney 1972) requires that the claim be "inter-
posed" before the time limit runs. Section 203(b) defines "interposed" in several
ways, the most commonly applicable being by service of the summons. Id.
203(b)l.
24. 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
25. The plaintiff apparently assumed that Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) required such a follow-
up if the acknowledgment form was not returned.
26. Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35, 36-37 (1984). See also supra note 24.
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that the mail service was not effective. The Second Circuit agreed
that "the running of the limitations... is governed by the New York
rule that limitations is tolled only by service of process" 27 but stated
that "the Federal Rules control the proper method of effecting ser-
vice."2 8 The court indicated that the issue of whether effective service
had been made was an issue of federal law interpreting the federal
Rule, not one of state law.29 The court concluded that service was ef-
fective when received, even if further efforts were required to com-
plete it.30 Thus, it held that the statute of limitations had been tolled
on receipt of the mailed process.
The Morse decision has been heavily criticized in subsequent cases
and commentary.31 Morse forces a hearing on the issue of receipt,
which is something the acknowledgment form was supposed to pre-
vent. Morse arguably also makes the follow-up provisions of the rule
superfluous. 32 The former may be valid criticism; the latter may or
may not be, depending on how the case is used in other situations.
Notwithstanding, there are other issues of analysis in the case that
generally are overlooked.
The Morse opinion did not attempt to ascertain whether New York
state courts would deem this service sufficient to toll the statute of
limitations. On the surface this may seem a strange omission, since it
is the New York tolling law that raises the issue.33 The Second Circuit
relied on Hanna v. PlumerM to support its conclusion that federal law
governs the effectiveness of service. In Hanna, the Supreme Court
held that substituted service on the executor of an estate under the
federal rules (by leaving the process at the executor's home with a
responsible person) was sufficient despite a state statute requiring per-
sonal service on the executor to commence the action.35 The Court
found a direct conflict between the federal rules and the state statute
and held the federal rule was applicable under the circumstances of
27. Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1984).
28. Id.
29. See id. at 38-39.
30. Id. at 40.
31. E.g., Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., 800 F.2d 53, 57 (3d Cir. 1986); Erickson v.
Kiddie, [1986-87 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,889 (N.D. Cal.
1986); Sinclair, supra note 6, at 1270-73; Comment, Morse v. Elmira Country Club:
Dealing with the Uncooperative Recipient of Mailed Service of Process under the
1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 OQio ST. L.J. 713
(1986); Note, Rule 4: Service by Mail May Cost You More Than A Stamp, 61 IND.
L.J. 217, 231-32 (1986).
32. Comment, supra note 31, at 720-21; Practice Commentaries, supra note 11, at 76.
33. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 203 (McKinney 1972). New York law is made applica-
ble in a diversity case on this issue by Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740
(1980).
34. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
35. Id. at 463-64.
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the case.36
Fifteen years later, in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,37 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed its long standing position that whether the statute of
limitations was tolled by filing of the complaint or by service of pro-
cess was controlled by state law.38 In Walker, the Court found that
Federal Rule 3, which provides that an action is commenced by filing,
was not intended to be controlling on the issue of tolling.3 9 Thus,
there was no conflict between state law and federal rules, with the
result that state law controlled. In the course of its decision, the Court
also stated that the issue of how tolling is effected is an "'integral'
part of the statute of limitations."40
Whether Walker or Hanna is more applicable to the Morse situa-
tion is not obvious.41 It is reasonable to say that under Hanna, if the
federal rules allow a method of service not provided by state law, ser-
vice can still be effective to toll the statute of limitations. Thus, the
fact that New York does not allow service by mail in its courts does
not prevent effective mail service in a federal court from tolling the
applicable statute in a diversity case. Under that reasoning, if service
by mail is effective (under federal law) on receipt, it would toll the
statute of limitations. This appears to be the position of the court in
Morse.
However, in Hanna, there was no question that the defendant had
been served effectively under federal law. The only question was
whether the successful use of Rule 4(d)(1) overrode state law.42 On
the other hand, if the issue of service versus filing is so important a
part of the statute of limitations that state law must apply, perhaps the
Morse court should have examined New York cases to see whether
deviations from the service rules would be considered fatal by New
York courts. Moreover, Walker and Hanna can be read together to
say that a state policy of giving notice to the defendant before tolling
the limitations period should be respected, but only up to a point.
36. Id. at 463-64, 472.
37. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
38. See, e.g., Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
39. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 (1980).
40. Id- at 752. That is a curious statement, considering that the state statute at issue
in Hanna not only directed personal service be made but provided that the stat-
ute of limitations would not be tolled by other than personal service. Indeed,
Justice Harlan, concurring in Hanna, suggested that Hanna overruled the Ragan
decision. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-78 (1965)(Harlan, J., concurring).
See also Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1968)(agree-
ing with Justice Harlan).
41. The Second Circuit examined both decisions and concluded that Hanna was the
applicable case. Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35, 37-39 (1984).
42. Indeed, to reconcile Hanna and Walker one must assume that Hanna was con-
cerned only with the proper manner of service, not something "integral" to the
state statute of limitations.
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When it is clear the defendant received the notice and the procedure
does not affect anything "integral" to the statute (as defined by state
law),43 the federal rule methods may be used. However, when the in-
tegrity of the state system is imperiled, use of the federal rule should
be circumscribed by applicable processes of state law. Here, Walker's
emphasis on a lack of conflict between federal and state rules is in-
structive. Adopting a state rule regarding the effectiveness of the stat-
ute of limitations does not impair the federal rule. Under this
analysis, federal mail service can still be used, but its effectiveness for
the statute of limitations may be tested under the principles of state
law.
One case, Lancaster v. Kindor,44 involved section 308 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") which governs service
"upon a natural person." Under section 308(4), if service is not made
personally, or on an agent, then the plaintiff must, in addition to serv-
ing at the home or business of the defendant, mail a copy of the pro-
cess to the defendant's home and file proof of having done both of
those things. Moreover, service is not "complete" until ten days after
the proof of service is filed.45 Nevertheless, Lancaster held that a fail-
ure to file the proof of service did not render service untimely for stat-
ute of limitations purposes.46 The court stated that the ten-day period
and the filing requirement related only to the defendant's time to an-
swer, not to tolling the statute of limitations.47
By comparison, in Furey v. Milgrom,48 the process server left the
summons at the defendant's home, pursuant to CPLR 308, on the last
day of the limitations period. However, he did not mail the process to
the defendant until the next day. The court held that both were re-
quired for effective service and, therefore, the action was untimely.49
In Yarusso v. Arbotowicz,5 0 the plaintiff attempted to serve a de-
fendant using a non-resident motorist statute.51 The statute allows
service on the Secretary of State of New York as agent for the absent
defendant and also requires the plaintiff to mail a copy of the process
to the defendant by certified or registered mail.52 Although service
43. Which may be another way of saying that they do not "abridge, enlarge or modify
... [a] substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
44. 98 A.D.2d 300, 471 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1984), aff'd mem., 65 N.Y.2d 804, 482 N.E.2d 923,
493 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1985).
45. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 308(4) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
46. Lancaster v. Kindor, 98 A.D.2d 300, 305, 471 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577 (1984).
47. I& at 306, 471 N.Y.S.2d at 577-78. See also Ward v. Kaufman, 120 A.D.2d 929, 502
N.Y.S.2d 883 (1986).
48. 44 A.D.2d 91, 353 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1974).
49. Id at 92, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 509-10.
50. 41 N.Y.2d 516, 362 N.E.2d 600, 393 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1977).
51. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw §§ 253-254 (McKinney 1986).
52. Id § 253(2).
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was made on the Secretary within the limitations period, the mailing
was never completed because the plaintiff did not have a correct ad-
dress for the defendant. 53 Service was therefore deemed incomplete
and the action dismissed.54 When the plaintiff later successfully
served the defendant, the New York Court of Appeals held the action
to be untimely and held the earlier service on the Secretary did not
toll the statute of limitations.5 5
What principles from these cases would be applicable to Morse?
Lancaster is easily distinguished from Morse. In Lancaster, the de-
fendant received all the notice to which he was entitled prior to the
running of the statute. In Morse, the defendant was arguably entitled
to additional notice. The Yarusso and Furey cases suggest that when
the notice-giving functions of the rule have not been completed, the
statute of limitations is not tolled. However, in Yarusso, service on a
state official did not give actual notice to the defendant; the mail ser-
vice in Morse gave actual notice. Furey, on the other hand, may be
closest to the Morse set of facts. The defendant probably received ac-
tual notice by the service at his home before the statute had run.
However, the court believed that the full complement of notice-giving
was necessary to fulfill the legislature's intent regarding the statute of
limitations. If Furey represents "the law" in New York,56 one could
say that New York requires strict adherence to the notice-giving re-
quirements of substituted service in order to toll the statute. This
would be "integral" (in the words of Walker) to the New York statute
of limitations. Rule 4 was not intended to measure the time at which
service is made for statute of limitations purposes; rather, Rule 4
speaks to methods of service.
If this analysis is correct, then Morse may be erroneous for reasons
other than those generally cited. However, even if the court should
53. Yarusso v. Arbotowicz, 41 N.Y.2d 516, 517, 362 N.E.2d 600, 601, 393 N.Y.S.2d 968,
969-70 (1977).
54. Id, at 517, 362 N.E.2d at 601, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
55. Id. at 519, 362 N.E.2d at 602, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 971. The court stated that prior cases
allowing incomplete service to toll the statute were inapplicable because in those
cases "following the 'incomplete' first step the defendant thereafter submit[ted]
to the jurisdiction of the court, thereby foreclosing a claim that no jurisdiction
was obtained because the 'service' within the statutory period was incomplete."
Id.
Yarusso was followed in Symonds v. Root, 107 A.D.2d 1071, 486 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1985) in which the plaintiff also sued an out of state defendant for damages suf-
fered in a traffic accident. Although service on the Secretary was accomplished
within the limitations period, no mailing was ever made. Id. at 1072, 486 N.Y.S.2d
at 554. The court held the action to be untimely. Id. at 1072, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
Symonds was decided after Morse and was not available to the court. However,
the Yarusso decision of the court of appeals, discussed above, was available to the
court
56. Recall that Furej is only an intermediate appellate decision.
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have looked to New York law, it could have reached the same result.
Furey has not been widely adopted in New York, and has been criti-
cized by the author of the Practice Commentary on the New York
statute.57 The Second Circuit did not attempt to conclude whether
Furey was incorrectly decided, whether the New York Court of Ap-
peals would reject it, or whether actual notice (rather than completed
service) would be sufficient to toll the statute.5 8
The result in Morse was perhaps a sympathetic one in which the
defendant apparently manipulated the rule to prevent a decision on
the merits of the case. However, the result in Morse was consistent
with the intent of statutes of limitations which is to provide a time
beyond which a defendant is entitled to repose if he or she has not
been notified of a pending action.59 If a defendant has been notified
within the time limit, there is no logical reason to allow a technicality
of service to prevent a plaintiff from having his or her day in court.
Morse also raises problems apart from the issue of the applicability
of New York cases. As some courts and commentators have pointed
out, the Morse approach leaves open the question of follow-up service
which appears to be required by Rule 4.60 One solution would allow
57. McLaughlin, Supplementary Practice Commentaries, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & H.
203, at 77-78 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
58. The criticism by Professor McLaughlin noted that another case, Chem-Trol Pol-
lution Servs. v. Ingraham, 42 A.D.2d 192, 345 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1973), had allowed
incomplete service to toll the statute of limitations. McLaughlin, supra note 57,
at 74. However, in Ingraham the state official against whom the action was
brought had actually been served; the defect was the failure to serve the Attorney
General within the statutory period. In view of the stricter approach taken by
the court of appeals in Yarusso, the Furey result may be correct, if undesirable.
Cf. Upstate Milke Coops. v. State Dep't of Agric. & Mkts., 101 A.D.2d 940, 941-42,
475 N.Y.S.2d 633, 634-35 (1984) (timely service on Attorney General not sufficient
when service on the Commissioner of Agriculture was required); see also Keogh
v. New York State Dep't of Health, 128 A.D.2d 841, 513 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1987).
Several cases have held that the provision of N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 203 (Mc-
Kinney 1972) allowing a sixty-day extension of the time limit if the summons is
delivered to the sheriff (or clerk in New York County) is effective when the sum-
mons is mailed, not received. E.g., Dowling v. Hillcrest Gen. Hosp., 89 A.D.2d 435,
439-40, 455 N.Y.S.2d 628, 631 (1982); Sanford v. Garvey, 81 A.D.2d 748, 438
N.Y.S.2d 410 (1981); Tracy v. New York Magazine Co., N.Y.L.J. June 13, 1975, at
16, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co.), aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 775, 376 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1975).
These cases are not applicable to the situation at hand. When N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L.
& R. 203(b)(5) (McKinney 1972) is involved, by definition the defendant does not
receive the summons. Thus, it makes little difference in terms of a policy of com-
pletion of service or actual notice whether the extension was measured from
mailing or receipt by the sheriff.
59. They do provide protection against stale claims, but this purpose is served when
there are large distinctions in time; a day more or less does not affect many claims
in terms of staleness.
60. E.g., Coldwell Banker & Co. v. Eyde, 5 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1050 (N.D. Ill.
1986); Erickson v. Kiddie, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
92,889 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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service to be effective for statute of limitations purposes on receipt,
but require the plaintiff to complete the service by the follow-up
procdure if no acknowledgment is received. The rule is very clear on
the requirement of a follow-up if no acknowledgment is received.
This solution allows the intent of Congress to be carried out and effec-
tively deals with the statute of limitations issue.
This appears to be the position taken by Judge Weinstein in Perkin
Eler v. Trans Mediterranean Airways, S.A.L.61 in which the court
denied a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and stated
in dicta:
Service by mail under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) need not be acknowledged to be ef-
fective. Personal delivery of process, however, also must be made unless an
'acknowledgment of service under this under this subdivision of this rule is
received by the sender within twenty days after the date of mailing.'6 2
If service that is sufficient to toll the statue of limitations is not
thereafter perfected, what is the result? One possible answer is the
way New York courts deal with the need to perfect service by filing
proof of service. If a follow-up is not made, the defendant's time to
answer does not begin to run.63 That would be a reasonable solution,
except that Rule 4(j), also added by the 1983 amendments, requires a
dismissal if service is not "made" within 120 days of the filing of the
action. This section was added to speed the progress of cases.6 4 It
would be contradictory to allow mail service to satisfy Rule 4(j) on
mailing or receipt while providing no effective limit on a plaintiff's
time to complete service thereby forcing a defendant to answer. The
appropriate solution requires a further examination of Rule 4(j) and
mail service.- As will be shown below, the solution poses potential
problems for unwary plaintiffs.
B. The 120-Day Rule and the Effectiveness of Service
One of the changes made in the 1983 amendments was the addition
of Rule 4(). Rule 4(j) requires that service be made within 120 days of
filing or the action must be dismissed.65 Prior to 1983, there was no
time limit on service, although a court could dismiss a case for lack of
prosecution if an excessive period passed without service being
61. 107 F.R.D. 55 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
62. 1d. at 58 (citation omitted)(emphasis supplied). In the case, however, Judge
Weinstein found that service had been acknowledged and the issue did not have
to be decided.
63. Cf Lancaster v. Kindor, 98 A.D.2d 300, 306, 471 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577-78 (1984), qff'd
mem., 65 N.Y.2d 804, 482 N.E.2d 923, 493 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1985)(requirement that
plaintiff mail process to defendant's home and file with the clerk of the court
after substituted service related only to defendant's time to answer).
64. See Quann v. Whitegate-Edgewater, 112 F.R.D. 649, 664 (D. Md. 1986) and cases
cited therein.
65. The only exception is if plaintiff shows good cause for the failure to serve.
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made.66 The interplay between the 120-day rule and mail service
tends to track the statute of limitations problem in Morse. Again, the
key is the time when service is "made." In the absence of an acknowl-
edgement, is service made only when the follow-up service is
completed?
In the Second Circuit, even when no issue of service versus filing
exists, courts have generally extended the reasoning of Morse by hold-
ing that service is effective on receipt for purposes of the 120-day
rule.6 7 However, almost all other courts have rejected Morse and re-
quire either that the acknowledgment be sent or that personal service
be completed in order to satisfy the rule.6S
Failure to satisfy Rule 4(j) has an apparently innocuous penalty-
dismissal without prejudice. There is naturally some embarrassment
in having a case dismissed on this ground, and no lawyer wants to ex-
plain the extra fee to a client. The case can be refiled, but if the stat-
ute of limitations has run before the case can be refiled, then the Rule
4(j) dismissal will be tantamount to a dismissal with prejudice. This
has the same potential for abuse by defendants as found in Morse.
However, a major difference between this situation and Morse is that
the legislative history points to a result.
Congressman Edwards' statement when presenting the bill deals
with this problem:
The problem would arise when a plaintiff files the complaint within the appli-
cable statute of limitation period but does not effect service for 120 days. If
the statute of limitation period expires during that period, and if the plain-
tiff's action is dismissed "without prejudice", can the plaintiff refile the com-
plaint and maintain the action? The answer depends upon how the statute of
limitation is tolled.
If the law provides that the statute of limitation is tolled by filing and ser-
vice of the complaint, then a dismissal under H.R. 7154 for failure to serve
within the 120 days would, by the terms of the law controlling the tolling, bar
the plaintiff from later maintaining the cause of action. If the law provides
that the statute of limitation is tolled by the filing alone, then the status of the
plaintiff's cause of action turns upon the plaintiff's diligence. If the plaintiff
has not been diligent, the court will dismiss the complaint for failure to serve
66. E.g., Richardson v. United White Shipping Co., 38 F.R.D. 494, 495-96 (N.D. Cal.
1965). In addition, if state law required service to toll the statute of limitations,
then a plaintiff had to respect that limit or be dismissed. See supra notes 23-64
and accompanying text.
67. E.g., Benage v. Gibralter Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 115 F.R.D. 20, 21 (D. Conn. 1987);
Schwartz v. All Credit Bureaus U.S.A., No. 85-6633-CSH (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,1986);
Lee v. Carlson, 645 F. Supp. 1430, 1432 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Deshmukh v. Cook, 630 F.
Supp. 956, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). See also United States v. Jack Cozza, Inc., 106
F.R.D. 264, 264-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(court cited Morse in a federal question case
where a failure to satisfy the 120-day rule would have allowed the statute of limi-
tations to run).
68. Of course, in some cases the issue is not whether service has been completed, but
whether the plaintiff has shown "good cause" for the failure to complete the
service.
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within 120 days, and the plaintiff will be barred from later maintaining the
cause of action because the statute of limitations has run. A dismissal without
prejudice does not confer upon the plaintiff any rights that the plaintiff does
not otherwise possess and leaves a plaintiff whose action has been dismissed in
the same position as if the action had never been filed.6
9
It is clear that Congress understood that cases could be barred as a
result of the 120-day rule. What is not clear from the discussion is
what constitutes "effective" service under the rule.
In the previous discussion of Morse, it was suggested that courts
could apply different standards for the effectiveness of service depend-
ing on the circumstance. Service could be deemed effective to toll the
statute of limitations without being sufficient to force a defendant to
litigate. However, Rule 4(j) and its legislative history indicate that
Congress wanted to ensure timely service even if some cases were
barred permanently.70
There is also a problem with permitting service to be effective on
receipt for purposes of Rule 4(j). Does the defendant's time to answer
run from receipt? Probably not.71 If not, the plaintiff must follow-up
to cause the suit to go forward. Is there a time limit for the follow-up?
Under the present hypothesis, receipt by a defendant satisfies Rule
4() which effectively eliminates the 120-day rule as a limit. There is
no other time limit in the rules.72 What is left is a situation equivalent
to the pre-amendment rules-no time limit on moving the case for-
ward. This was not Congress' intent when it enacted Rule 4(j).
In order to satisfy Rule 4(j), it seems that service must be acknowl-
edged, or a follow-up made, within 120 days. One solution would allow
the statute of limitations to be tolled on receipt, but only on the condi-
tion that Rule 4(j) is complied with. If Rule 4(j) is not satisfied, the
action would be dismissed. Once the action is dismissed, state law
would probably bar refifling because of the statute of limitations.73 In
jurisdictions where filing tolls the statute of limitations, the result
would be similar; the statute would be tolled by filing, but the subse-
quent dismissal would wipe out the tolling effect. The legislative his-
tory quoted above shows that Congress was well aware of this
possibility.
C. Effect on Defendant's Time to Answer
Another aspect of determining when mail service is "made" is its
69. See Siegel, supra note 2, at 119-20 (Appendix A - Congressional Record reprint of
the relevant legislative history of the Amendment)(footnotes omitted).
70. See i& at 127-28 (Advisory Committee Note to proposed Rule 4(j)).
71. See infra notes 74-94 and accompanying text.
72. Presumably, the court would dismiss the case eventually for failure to prosecute
as was the case prior to Rule 4(j).
73. See, e.g., Markoff v. South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283, 287-89, 461
N.E.2d 1253, 1254-55, 473 N.Y.S.2d 766, 767-68 (1984).
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direct effect on the defendant's time to answer. Two problems must
be addressed. The first involves the portion of Rule 12(a) that re-
quires an answer to the complaint "within twenty days after the ser-
vice of the summons and complaint upon [the] defendant."74 In order
to calculate the date the answer is due, the precise date when service
was made on the defendant must be determined. The second problem
deals with the interaction between Rule 6(e) and mail service and
whether this extends the defendant's time to respond.
As to the first problem, personal service poses no ambiguity; ser-
vice is made at the moment the process is handed to the defendant or
the designated surrogate. With mail service, there are many possible
points at which service might be made: 1) when process is mailed;
2) when process is received by the defendant; 3) when the return ac-
knowledgment is executed; 4) when the return acknowledgement is
mailed by the defendant; 5) when the acknowledgment is received by
the plaintiff; or 6) when personal service is made if no acknowledge-
ment is received. Each has its own problems.
In California, whose statute was the model for the federal rule, the
answer is simple. Section 415.30(c) of the California Code of Civil Pro-
cedure provides that service is complete when the acknowledgment is
executed. Unfortunately, no such section exists under the Federal
Rules. The courts have been left to sort this out for themselves.
No federal court has used the time of mailing as the date at which
service is made.75 To do so would be contrary to the intent of the mail
service provisions of the rule. Congress created safeguards to insure
actual notice to the defendant. Allowing the time to answer to begin
running before actual notice is received does not comport with the pol-
icy behind the rule.76
As discussed above, there is a dispute in the courts about the effec-
tiveness of mail service prior to the return of an acknowledgment. In
the Second Circuit, courts generally cite Morse in support of the prop-
osition that service is effective upon the receipt of process by the de-
fendant. 77 This does not require that the time to answer begin to
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a). The rule allows for a longer time when the defendant is in
the United States or when service is made by a state long-arm statute (under
Rule 4(e)) and state or federal law gives a defendant more than twenty days to
respond. However, mail service cannot be used when serving the United States.
FED. R. CIv. P. 4(c)(2)(C). Few courts allow extraterritorial mail service, so the
issue has not arisen under Rule 4(e).
75. At least one district promulgated a local rule pin-porting to being the period to
answer from the date of mailing. However, the rule was held invalid by a district
court in Madden v. Cleland, 105 F.R.D. 520, 524-25 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
76. See Green v. Humphrey Elevator & Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 881-82 (3d Cir.
1987)(construing Rule 40), the court rejected the argument that service was
made on mailing).
77. E.g., Benage v. Gibralter Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 115 F.R.D. 20, 21 (D. Conn. 1987);
Deshmukh v. Cook, 630 F. Supp. 956, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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expire at that point, but this is the most logical position if service is
deemed effective at that point.78 In those jurisdictions that reject
Morse, it would be strange to find a case holding that a defendant's
time to answer begins to run from receipt of process when service is
not yet effective to allow the court to have jurisdiction over the de-
fendant. Moreover, if a follow-up is required to complete service (as
suggested in Perkin Elmer), even Morse would be hard pressed to
force the defendant to answer when the plaintiff is still required to do
more to complete service.
Only a handful of cases have discussed the issue, and even those
cases often leave ambiguities. For example, the court in Red Elk v.
Stotts,79 construing Rule 4(j), stated that "[t]he majority rule appears
to be that service becomes effective upon the return of the acknowl-
edgement forms."8 0 Assuming the return of the acknowledgment
form marks the beginning of the answer period, the majority rule is
still ambiguous. Does it mean when the forms are executed, when
they are mailed back to the plaintiff, or when they are received by the
plaintiff?s
A more definite answer was given in Rust v. City ofKansas City.82
There the court held that the time to answer began to run when the
acknowledgement was signed "so long as the acknowledgment is made
within the requisite twenty days of mailing the process."8 3 The Ninth
Circuit recently came to the same conclusion and cited Rust with
approval.8 4
A more comprehensive analysis, again with the same conclusion, is
found in Madden v. CZeland.8 5 In Madden, the court noted the federal
rule was modeled on the California statute and concluded that the fed-
eral rule on effectiveness of service should follow California.8 6 The
court also noted that Form 18-A, the acknowledgment form prescribed
78. Note that Morse does not require the conclusion that service is effective for all
purposes upon receipt. Morse could be used to resolve the statute of limitations
issue differently, but courts in the Second Circuit have not given Morse such a
narrow interpretation.
79. 111 F.R.D. 87 (D. Mont. 1986).
80. I& at 89.
81. In Blair v. Zimmerman, No. 86-7037, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31,1987) (WESTLAW,
DCT database), the court was confronted with the twenty-day issue directly. As
in Red Elk, the court used the ambiguous language of "returned" as the time to
mark effective service without defining it. However, the court was able to avoid
the issue because it was clear that under any definition of "returned," the plain-
tiff was not entitled to a default judgment. Id. at 4-6.
82. 107 F.R.D. 370 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
83. Id. at 371. This is very similar to the California rule. CAL CIrV. PRoc. CODE
§ 415.30(c) (West 1973). It is not clear why the Rust court required mailing within
twenty days, unless it assumed that one cannot accept a late acknowledgment.
84. See Worrell v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 845 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1988).
85. 105 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
86. Id. at 525.
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by the federal rules, indicated that an answer would be expected
within twenty days if the defendant signed and returned the form. A
defendant could conclude that failure to sign the form would not start
the time to answer.8 7 Thus, a reasonable expectation would be that
the time to answer runs from the time of acknowledgment, if made, or
from alternative service, if no acknowledgement is made.88
The Madden approach is a sound one. Courts should not rush to
default judgments when the rule is ambiguous. Using the date of exe-
cution comports with the reasonable expectations of the defendant
and does not unduly delay a judgment if the defendant does not an-
swer the complaint. The main problem is that the date the acknowl-
edgment is signed is subject to manipulation by defendants. However,
the plaintiff is rarely prejudiced by not knowing precisely when the
defendant's time to answer is up.8 9
The second problem affecting the defendant's time to answer in-
volves Rule 6(e). That rule provides:
(e) Additional Time After Service by Mail. Whenever a party has the right
or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a prescribed
period after the service of a notice or other paper upon the party and the no-
tice or paper is served upon the party by mail, three days shall be added to the
prescribed period.9 0
Does "other paper" include a summons and complaint? On the face of
the rule, the answer appears to be yes. It is not an issue that has re-
ceived much attention from the courts.
Madden v. Caeland 91 appears to be the only case that has addressed
this issue. Madden held that Rule 6(e) does not apply to mail ser-
vice.92 This reasoning is logical because added time provided by Rule
6(e) was in response to the fact that mail often takes three days to
arrive. Thus, it gives the recipient approximately the same amount of
87. See Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984).
88. Madden v. Cleland, 105 F.R.D. 520, 524 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
89. Curiously enough, this issue does not appear to have surfaced prior to the 1983
amendments. Although states allow various forms of substituted service, includ-
ing mail service, which may be used under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i), state statutes tend
to be more specific about when service is deemed complete. E.g., CAL. CIVIL
PRAC. CODE § 415.20 (West 1973)(substituted service at home or office complete
ten days after a copy of the process is mailed to the defendant). State statutes
may also require something to be filed with the court before the time to answer
starts running. E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 308(2) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
Thus, the litigants would have a clearer idea about their responsibilities.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e).
91. 105 F.R.D. 520 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
92. However, in State ex rel. Baber v. Circuit Court, 454 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ind. 1983),
the Indiana Supreme Court indicated that service by certified mail (see IND. CODE
ANN. T.R. 4.11 (Burns 1976)) did extend the defendant's time to answer by three
days. Indiana's rule extending time when service is made by mail is virtually the
same as the federal rule. Compare IND. CODE ANN. T.R. 6(E) (Burns 1976) with
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e).
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time from the point of actual notice to take action as if the papers
were served personally. If the time to answer begins only after the
acknowledgment is executed, the defendant has full control over the
beginning of the period and has actual notice of the complaint when
the time begins to run. Thus, there is no need to give an extra three
days. The time it takes for the mail to arrive is irrelevant to the time
allotted to answer. 93
It is refreshing that the Madden court was willing to interpret the
rules to reach a reasonable result when so many courts are reading the
mail service rule very literally, even if the results are illogical. Read-
ing Rule 6(e) very literally, one would conclude that the extra three
days should be added. The Madden result, however, makes more
sense.94
D. Deterring Defendants from Unjustified Failures
to Acknowledge Service
A major difficulty with the harsh approach to the effective date of
service taken by many courts is the incentive thereby given to defend-
ants not to acknowledge service. The only sanction provided for in the
rules is that defendants may be assessed the costs of personal service if
they fail to acknowledge. Such costs are hardly a real sanction. In two
reported cases, costs of under $100 were awarded.9 s Furthermore, the
cost of making a motion for personal service costs is greater than the
sanction. Unless attorneys' fees for making the motion are included,
there is no effective sanction. Courts generally have not allowed at-
93. Of course, if one uses the time of mailing to begin the answering period, Rule 6(e)
makes sense and appears covered by the "other paper" language. In a court
where service is deemed effective and time to answer runs from receipt of pro-
cess, there is also no need to use Rule 6(e) because the mailing time is not sub-
tracted from the time to answer, so no adjustment is necessary.
94. In Blair v. Zimmerman, No. 86-7037, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31,1987) (WESTLAW
DCT database), the court used Rule 6(e) in a different way. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)
requires the plaintiff to use an alternative method of service if no acknowledge-
ment is received within twenty days. Blair held that when calculating the twenty
days, the extra three days of Rule 6(e) is applicable. Id. at 5. This is reasonable
because the mailing triggers the twenty-day period. However, the issue is of lit-
tle practical significance. It appears that plaintiffs may accept a late acknowledg-
ment. See United States v. Gluklick, 801 F.2d 834, 837 (6th Cir. 1986) (defendant's
stipulation to accept service after 120-day period had run upheld); but see Cold-
well Banker & Co. v. Eyde, 661 F. Supp. 657, 658-59 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss where it was impossible to return acknowledgment
form within twenty days of mailing). Furthermore, nothing prevents a plaintiff
from using personal service prior to the running of the twenty-day period.
95. United States ex rel Itri Brick & Concrete Corp. v. Union Indem. Ins. Co., 109
F.R.D. 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (the court awarded costs of $67.60 plus transcript
fees); Eden Foods, Inc. v. Eden's Own Prods., Inc., 101 F.R.D. 96 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(awarding a total of $59.25 for service on two defendants).
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torneys' fees,9 6 so it is not surprising that there are so many cases of
defendants refusing to acknowledge and plaintiffs taking chances with
late mail services.
The solution is twofold. First, defendants who receive process but
refuse to acknowledge should be assessed attorneys' fees as well as
process server costs. One must assume that Congress meant to impose
a real sanction when it passed the rule. If the rule is to become some-
thing other than a tactical game for defendants, a real sanction must
be imposed. The difficulty with this is the wording of the rule. Unlike
the situation with discovery sanctions9 7 or sanctions for frivolous ac-
tions,98 Congress did not expressly provide for attorneys' fees in Rule
4(c)(2)(D). This may be because the California statute, which was the
model for the mail service rule, also does not provide for attorneys
fees, allowing only for "expenses."99 Notwithstanding, this should not
stop a court from imposing such a sanction in a supervisory role. A
possible statutory authority for attorneys' fees might be derived from
the federal statute prohibiting one from "unreasonably and vexa-
tiously" multiplying the necessary proceedings.00 If not, a rules
change is in order.
Second, in cases in which the statute of limitations would run if the
rule is invoked, the defendant's refusal to acknowledge service should
weigh strongly in favor of granting an extension of the 120-day period
96. The issue is almost never discussed. One case expressly rejected attorneys' fees.
Miele v. William Morrow & Co., No. 85-4333, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 1986)
(WESTLAW, DCT database). At least one case allowed attorneys' fees to be in-
cluded in the award of costs, but without any discussion of the issue. C.I.T. Leas-
ing Corp. v. Manth Mach. & Tool Corp., No. 85-261C, slip op. (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 3,
1985). See also Green v. Humphrey Elevator & Truck Co., 816 F.2d 877, 883 (3d
Cir. 1987)(citing CI.T with apparent approval).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4).
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
99. There do not appear to be any reported cases under the California statute. It may
be that CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West Supp. 1988) and Bauguess v. Paine, 22
Cal. 3d 626, 586 P.2d 942, 150 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1978), which only allow attorneys'
fees when agreed to or expresssly provided in a statute, would preclude such
recoveries.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). This statute expressly allows attorneys' fees to be recov-
ered. A more creative approach would use Rule 11, but only by implication. Rule
11 allows sanctions, including attorneys' fees, to be imposed on a party who inter-
poses any paper "for any improper purpose." Willful frustration of the purpose
of Rule 4 would seem to satisfy the "improper purpose" test. However, the sanc-
tion would not be imposed for "interposing" a paper; quite the contrary, it would
be imposed for a failure to return a paper. On the other hand, a sanction is cer-
tainly within the spirit of the rule, and this may strengthen a court's argument
that sanctions may be imposed under the court's supervisory powers. Another
approach would be to impose sanctions by a local rule. Although such a rule
would be consistent with Rule 11, it might be deemed inconsistent with the ex-
press terms of Rule 4(c)(2)(D), which does not provide for attorneys' fees. If so,
the local rule would be invalid. See FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
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under the "good cause" exception. This is particularly compelling
when the plaintiff moves for an extension prior to the expiration of
the time period.101
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF MAIL SERVICE1O2
It would probably surprise many plaintiffs' lawyers to learn they
cannot use a method of service specifically provided for by the federal
rules in an action brought in a federal court. However, a clear major-
ity of courts have held that the mail service provision of Federal Rule
4 cannot be used if the plaintiff uses the state long-arm statute to bring
in an out-of-state defendant.103 This seemingly anomalous result is
101. But c., Lovelace v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 820 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1987)(time limits of
Rule 4(j) are to be strictly enforced; reliance on the word of the process server
that the defendant had been served is not sufficient).
102. This section does not discuss service by mail in a foreign state. There is a serious
question whether Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is applicable to that situation. See Jarvis &
Mellman, supra note 6, at 23-27; Practice Commentaries, supra note 11, at 68-69.
The wording of Rule 4(i) suggests that Rules 4(e) and (i) provide the only
methods of service in foreign countries. If Rule 4(e) does not encompass mail
service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), see infra note 103, then mail service may not
apply. Furthermore, Rule 4(i) may itself be superseded by the Hague Convention
Agreement on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, Nov. 15,
1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I-.AS. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163. Although Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(ii) was enacted after the Hague Convention, it is not clear that
Congress intended it to supersede the Convention's provisions. The Supreme
Court has suggested somewhat indirectly that the Convention's procedures may
be mandatory for American courts. Societe Nationale Industielle Aerospatiale v.
United States Dist. Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2550 n.15 (1987); see Cooper v. Makita,
U.S.A., Inc., 117F.R.D. 16, 17-18 (D. Me. 1987); see also Ackermann v. Levine, 788
F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1986).
103. E.g., Poulos v. Wilson, 116 F.R.D. 326, 328 n.1 (D. Vt. 1987); Cavaness v. Kreutz, 7
Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 215, 216 (W.D. Mo. 1987); Grosser v. Commodity
Exch., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1293,1315-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Catalyst Energy Dev. Corp.
v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 427, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Antrim v. Jef-
ferson-Pilot Corp., No. 85-0599 slip op. (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1985) (WESTLAW DCT
database); Olympus Corp. v. Dealer Sales & Serv., Inc. 107 F.R.D. 300, 303-04
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); Korkala v. National Se. Agency, 107 F.R.D. 229, 230 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); Daley v. ALIA, 105 F.R.D. 87, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Thermo-Cell Southeast,
Inc. v. Technetic Indus., 605 F. Supp. 1122, 1124 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Reno Distribs.,
Inc. v. West Texas Oil Field Equip., Inc., 105 F.R.D. 511, 512-13 (D. Kan. 1985);
Padovani v. Spectacor, Inc., 112 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D. Del. 1985); Fogleman v. Aramco,
623 F. Supp. 908, 910 (W.D. La. 1985); Akzona, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 607 F. Supp. 227, 240 (D. Del. 1984); Epstein v. Wilder, 596 F. Supp. 793, 797
(N.D. 111. 1984); Chronister v. Sam Tanksley Trucking, Inc., 109 F.R.D. 1, 1 (N.D.
IM. 1984); San Miguel & Compania, Inc., v. International Harvester Export Co., 98
F.R.D. 572, 573 (D.P.R. 1983); William B. May Co. v. Hyatt, 98 F.R.D. 569, 570
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). See Kumar v. Ford, 111 F.R.D. 34,38 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). Contra
Federal Land Bank v. Federal Land Bank of Texas, No. 87-0085, slip op. (D.D.C.
Aug. 31, 1987); McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465, 1487 (11th Cir. 1986); A.I.M.
Int'l, Inc. v. Battenfeld Extrusions Sys., 116 F.R.D. 633, 637 (M.D. Ga. 1987); Boggs
v. Darr, 103 F.R.D. 526,527-28 (D. Kan. 1987). Cf. FDIC v. Mount Vernon Ranch,
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the subject of this section.
A. The Competing Case Law
The most cited argument against using mail service out of state was
set forth in William B. May Co. v. Hyatt. 0 4 Briefly, the argument of
Hyatt and the courts following it is as follows. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)-
the mail service provision-is subject to the limitations of Rule 4(f) in
the absence of any congressional indication to the contrary. Rule 4(f)
limits the territorial reach of process to the borders of the state in
which the court sits.105 The only way around Rule 4(f) is Rule 4(e).
Rule 4(e) permits extraterritorial service in two sets of circumstances:
(1) when a federal statute or order allows it, in which case service is
made in the manner provided in the statute or order, "or, if there is no
provision therein prescribing the manner of service, in a manner
stated in this rule";106 or (2) if the state in which the district court sits
has a statute allowing for extraterritorial service, "service ... may be
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the
statute."107 Thus, when a federal statute prescribes the standard of
amenability, mail service may be used no matter where the defendant
resides. However, when the federal court relies on the state long-arm
statute for authority to assert jurisdiction over non-residents, the
court is limited to the "circumstances" and "manner" of service set
out in the state statute. Thus, service by mail, when not authorized by
state law, is not permitted when state amenability standards are the
basis for personal jurisdiction.10
Although this was not an issue before mail service was expressly
authorized, there is support for the Hyatt position in a handful of cases
decided before the recent amendments. It is not surprising that few
cases discussed the issue before 1983. Until then, the only methods
expressly provided for in Rule 4 were personal service and service on a
person of "suitable age and discretion" at the defendant's home.109 A
plaintiff using a state long-arm statute was far more likely to use the
easier methods set out in a state statute. Alternatively, the methods
set forth in Rule 4 usually satisfied state law as well.
Inc., 118 F.R.D. 496, 498-500 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (noting the split but declining to
decide the issue because subsequent personal service was held valid).
104. 98 F.R.D. 569 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
105. Except for the "100 mile bulge" provision allowing service on parties joined pur-
suant to Rules 14 and 19 who are within 100 miles of the courthouse.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
107. Id.
108. It is worth noting that under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) and its predecessor, Rule 4(d)(7),
even when service is to be made within the state, one can serve competent adults
and corporations using any method provided by the forum state's law.
109. See FED. R. CIv. P. 4(d)(1), (3).
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In Davis v. Musler,1o an action brought in a New York federal
court, process was served on certain defendants in Florida by serving
at their houses under Rule 4(d)(1). The Second Circuit determined
that "Rule 4(d)(1) applies only when a complaint is served within the
territorial limits of the state in which the district court where the ac-
tion is pending sits."111 New York law, which did not allow service in
the manner prescribed by Rule 4(d)(1), was said to apply." 2
A similar result based on similar facts was reached in Zarcone v.
Condie,113 which was cited with approval by the court in Davis.114 In-
deed, post-1983 amendment cases have felt constrained to apply the
holding of Davis, a pre-amendment case, to the federal mail service
provision.115 Although these cases are part of a clear majority, their
reasoning is not persuasive. There are some courts that have held the
-opposite and allowed mail service to be used with state long-arm stat-
utes. Unfortunately, the few courts taking the opposite view do not
undertake a rigorous analysis to support their view.
For example, in ALM. International, Inc. v. Battenfeld Extrusions
Systems," 6 the court, after discussing Hyatt as the leading case against
using mail service, cited Morse" 7 as support for a contrary position.
In Morse, however, the defendant was the Elmira Country Club,
which is presumably found in or near Elmira, New York. The action
was brought in the Western District of New York. No out of state
service was required. Further, the court cited language in Morse that
"plaintiffs may serve process in the manner specifically provided by
the Federal Rules even if state law mandates a contrary method of
service."'' This sounds supportive but is taken out of context. The
passage from Morse was discussing the holding of Hanna v. Plumer.19
In Hanna there was no question about extraterritorial service and the
110. 713 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1983).
11. Id. at 913.
112. Id. at 914. New York law required a mailing as well as delivery to the residence.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 308(2) (McKinney 1972).
113. 62 F.R.D. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
114. Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 913 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Schwind v. Gordon, 93
F.R.D. 517, 519 (N.D. Ga. 1982); Merz v. Hemmerle, 90 F.R.D. 566, 568 n.4
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
115. See Poulos v. Wilson, 116 F.R.D. 326, 328 n.1 (D. Vt. 1987); Catalyst Energy Dev.
Corp. v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 427,428 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Olym-
pus Corp. v. Dealer Sales & Serv., Inc., 107 F.ILD. 300, 303 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Union
Carbide Corp. v. McKeown Transp. Corp., No. 84 Civ. 3716 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. June
21,1985) (WESTLAW DCT database); Reno Distribs., Inc. v. West Texas Oil Field
Equip., Inc., 105 F.RD. 511, 512-13 (D. Kan. 1985); but see Boggs v. Darr, 103
F.ILD. 526, 527 (D. Kan. 1984).
116. 116 F.R.D. 633 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
117. Morse v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1984).
118. A.I.M. Int'l. Inc. v. Battenfield Extrusions Sys., 116 F.RD. 633, 636 (citing Morse
v. Elmira Country Club, 752 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1984)).
119. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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interplay of Rules 4(d) and 4(e). Instead, Hanna dealt with a situation
in which the federal rule clearly provided for service in the manner
performed. The question was whether a state rule on how a statute of
limitations would be tolled by service should be followed. There was
no question about the use of state long-arm amenability statutes and
their interaction with the methods of service; the mail service cases
are purely interpretations of Rule 4 which were not at issue in Hanna.
The Court in A.IM. also cited what it termed "clear" legislative
history in support of using mail service.' 2 0 Although the court cited
portions of the legislative history in support of mail service, particu-
larly the portion stating that the new rule "authorizes four methods of
serving a summons and complaint,"12 (one being mail service without
any qualifications about long-arm), the history as a whole is far from
"clear." For one thing, the language cited by the court states that the,
new rule "carries forward the policy of the current rule" by permit-
ting service in accordance with the law of the forum state.12 2 As dis-
cussed above, several courts held under the old rule that the policy of
the rule did not permit using federal methods not authorized by state
law when serving out of state individuals under a state long-arm
statute.
Second, as originally proposed by the Supreme Court, Rule 4(e)
was to be amended specifically to allow for mail service out of state.
Congress deleted that provision in its amendments. One could there-
fore conclude that Congress did not intend to authorize mail service,
except where service is made pursuant to a federal long-arm statute.
However weak the A..M. court's reasoning, it is submitted that
extraterritorial service by mail can be upheld under Rule 4. Thus, the
next section analyzes why the A..M. court was correct in result, but
wrong in reasoning.
B. Analysis-Extraterritorial Service Supported
Proponents of the use of mail service often look to the wording of
Rule 4(e) for support. They note that the rule states that if a state has
a long-arm statute, then service "may... be ... made in the manner
prescribed in . .. [that] statute."1 23 A question asked by the propo-
nents is why make the use of state methods discretionary if it was
meant to be mandatory?
There is an explanation for the wording of the rule. The first sen-
tence of Rule 4(e) allows out of state service using any applicable fed-
120. A.I.M. Int'l. Inc. v. Battenfield Extrusions Sys., 116 F.R.D. 633, 637 (M.D. Ga.
1987).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Practice Commentaries, supra note 11, at 51 (emphasis added).
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eral statute. If the second sentence of Rule 4(e) (relating to state
statutes) was made mandatory, it would make the first sentence su-
perfluous. On the other hand, it would have been a simple matter for
Congress or the Advisory Committee to have drafted the rule to allow
discretion in using state or federal statutes but mandating state meth-
ods where state amenability standards are used.
Rule 4(e) contains another peculiarity. The first sentence ex-
pressly authorizes use of the methods in Rule 4 when a federal statute
fails to mandate a method. The second sentence states that one may
serve "under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed" by
state law.'2 4 The connector "and" could suggest that the two-amena-
bility and mechanics of service-are intended to go hand in hand.
However, it could be that the Advisory Committee simply wanted to
insure that when state long-arm statutes allowed extraterritorial ser-
vice by methods not otherwise authorized by state law, those methods
were permitted.
It is certainly unfortunate that Congress chose not to redraft the
rule to clarify this point. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) (and former Rule 4(d)(7))
already allowed resort to state methods of service. This situation ex-
isted even before Rule 4(e) was amended in 1963 to allow the use of
state long-arm statutes. When Rule 4(e) was originally amended in
1963, the point could have been clarified, but at that time the methods
of service prescribed by Rule 4 were so limited that no one foresaw the
problem. 5 The paucity of cases prior to 1983 supports this and may
have prevented Congress from seeing the problem and the need to
clarify Rule 4.
Several aspects of the rule point in favor of using mail service.
First, a major impetus for the 1983 amendment was to eliminate the
use of marshals as process servers in most instances.126 This shifts the
burden and cost of the service to the plaintiff. Mail service provides
an efficient and inexpensive method of service. If Rule 4 is inter-
preted to exclude such service, then, in states that do not sanction mail
service, costs will be shifted to plaintiffs in ways that were probably
unintended. Any diversity case filed in a state other than where the
defendant lives requires out-of-state service using state long-arm stat-
utes. Many federal statutes allow private remedies but do not contain
long-arm provisions. In those situations, resort is made to state long-
arm statutes when the defendant is a non-resident of the state.2 7 This
represents a large number of cases. It would be strange to assume that
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (emphasis added).
125. Practice Commentaries, supra note 11, at 51.
126. Letter from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Attorney General, to Peter W.
Rodino, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, reprinted in 96 F.R.D. 123;
Statement of Congressman Edwards, reprinted in 96 F.R.D. 116.
127. See Omni Capital, Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404 (1987).
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Congress meant to exclude such cases from the new inexpensive alter-
native and relegate them to whatever state law provided.
Second, the 1963 amendment to Rule 4(e) allowing use of state
long-arm statutes was seen as a way of broadening avenues of service.
The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that the intent was to insure
that plaintiffs were no worse off in federal court than in state court.12s
Third, the 1963 amendment to Rule 4(f) added the so-called "100-
mile bulge" provision. Parties joined pursuant to Rules 14 and 19 are
amenable to federal process, state amenability statutes notwithstand-
ing, as long as they live within 100-miles of the courthouse. Under
Rule 4(e), the existence of a federal amenability standard for such par-
ties should permit use of federal methods of service. However, many
such cases will be diversity cases in which, for example, courts are
ruling that the original defendant cannot be served by mail under
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii). One suspects that, if pushed, courts might say that
Rule 4(f) reflects the desire to have entire controversies determined
together, provided that the case is properly in the court to begin with.
It is easy to see how a plaintiff might manipulate the parties to elimi-
nate some defendants with the expectation that they would be
brought in later via Rule 19 or Rule 14. The "entire controversy" ar-
gument also does not provide a satisfactory explanation of why mail
service can be used for some parties but not for others. It is likely that
Congress did not see this anomaly when it passed the mail service
provision.
Thus, as with other parts of Rule 4, both the rule and its legislative
history are ambiguous. Until the rule is amended, however, ambigui-
ties should be "construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action."12 9 With that approach, mail service
ought to be allowed in any federal action.
III. OPTIONS IF NO ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF SERVICE
IS RETURNED
Congress did not rely on the infallibility of the mails when it en-
acted the mail service rule. To insure actual notice, the rule provides
that if the acknowledgment is not returned within twenty days of
mailing, "service of [the] summons and complaint shall be made under
subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph in the manner prescribed
by subdivision (d)(1) or (d)(3)."130 Basically, this requires either per-
sonal service or substituted service by delivery to a responsible person
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee notes to 1963 Amendments, 28 U.S.C.A. 94
("[T]here appears to be no reason for denying plaintiffs means of commencing
actions in Federal courts which are generally available in the State courts.").
129. FED. . CIV. P. 1.
130. FED. R. CIv. P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).
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living at the defendant's home.13 1
The statutory language seems very clear and does not appear to
give the plaintiff other options. Nevertheless, this provision has en-
gendered numerous court opinions. Many plaintiffs have argued that
when no acknowledgment is received they are free to revert to Rule
4(c)(2)(C)(i) which allows service by any method provided for by state
law.132 They reason that it would have been proper to use such meth-
ods in lieu of mail service, and there is no reason to prevent them from
doing so now. In short, plaintiffs can urge that the mail service effec-
tively be ignored and the later service be used to obtain jurisdiction.
Although courts tend not to view it this way, the issue actually in-
volves two steps and requires the answering of two questions. First, is
service effective even if no follow-up service is performed? If so, one
need not decide the question of what sort of follow-up is required.
Second, if service is not effective merely by receipt of process (i.e. ac-
tual notice), what is required for proper service?
Those courts answering the first question in the affirmative gener-
ally rely on Morse for support.133 They require a showing that the
defendant actually received the summons and complaint. Although
this position is equitable, it is an incorrect reading of the rule. Con-
gress obviously inserted the follow-up provision to insure the best pos-
sible notice to the defendant. 34 The provision for paying plaintiffs'
service costs in Rule 4(c)(2)(D) makes clear that Congress anticipated
that some defendants with actual notice would fail to return the ac-
knowledgment. The costs provision was not enacted merely to ease
the plaintiffs' mind should they follow-up just to make sure that ser-
vice was received. The only reasonable conclusion is that service with-
out a follow-up is not effective service. However, as discussed
previously, one can allow service to toll the statute of limitations upon
receipt, while still requiring follow-up service to forestall a Rule
12(b)(5) motion.
Assuming some sort of follow-up is necessary, how may it be
accomplished? 35
131. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), (3).
132. See infra note 140.
133. E.g., Benage v. Gibralter Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 115 F.R.D. 20,21 (D. Conn. 1987)(de-
nying defendant's motion to dismiss where no follow-up had been made);
Deshmukh v. Cook, 630 F. Supp. 956, 959 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(same). See Lee v. Carl-
son, 645 F. Supp. 1430, 1432 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
134. See 96 F.R.D. 118 (statement of Congressman Edwards)(citing criticism of the
original proposal for service by certified mail and stating that under Congress'
proposal "the defendant will receive actual notice of the claim").
135. Some cbses, although cited by courts as support on this issue, do not really get to
this step. They often deal with the situation in which the plaintiff has not at-
tempted any follow-up and is now trying to defend either a motion to reopen a
default judgment, a motion to dismiss based on statute of limitations grounds, or
the 120-day provision of Rule 4(j). See, e.g., Stranahan Gear Co. v. NL Indus., 800
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Some plaintiffs have argued that when service by mail is permitted
by state law, the failed federal mail service should be deemed proper
service under state law via Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i).136 An appropriate re-
sponse is contained in Armco, Inc. v. Prenrod-Stauffer Building Sys-
tems. 137 In Armco, the plaintiff mailed the appropriate federal forms
but never received an acknowledgment. A default was eventually en-
tered, and when the defendant's motion to reopen was denied, the de-
fendant appealed to the Fourth Circuit. The plaintiff argued that
Maryland allowed mail service, and that the original service (which
the plaintiff conceded did not satisfy Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)) should be
deemed to have effected valid service under Maryland law. The
Fourth Circuit disagreed, noting that the acknowledgment "explicitly
told [defendants] that they need do nothing if they did not accept and
acknowledge service, though they might be required to pay the cost of
service by some other means." 138
However, the language in Armco has been used in support of a
more far-reaching proposition; once a plaintiff attempts service under
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), he or she is thereafter precluded from using state
law methods to serve process.' 3 9 This is an issue on which the courts
are divided.140
F.2d 53 (3d Cir. 1986) (motion to reopen default); In re Alexander Grant & Co.
Litigation, 110 F.R.D. 544 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Coldwell Banker & Co. v. Eyde, 5 Fed.
R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1050 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (motion to quash service). Once a
court rejects the Morse approach, it is clear that service without a follow-up will
be ineffective. However, in these cases it was not necessary to determine whether
resort to state law methods of service was proper because no such attempt had
been made.
136. E.g., Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437,440 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Armco, Inc.
v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th Cir. 1984).
137. 733 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1984).
138. Id. at 1089 (footnote omitted). The District of Columbia Circuit came to the same
conclusion on very similar facts. Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437,
447-48 (D.C. Cir. 1987). However, in Picon v. Sutar Beach Condominiums No. 1
Homeowners Ass'n, CIV 1987/29 (D.V.I. April 14, 1988), the court held that unac-
knowledged mail service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) still could be effective service
on a non-inhabitant under Virgin Islands law pursuant to Rule 4(e). The court
distinguished Armco on the grounds that in Armco the alternative was to use
Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i). However, the Picon court's analysis overlooks the unfairness
to defendants that prompted the Armco decision. In Picon, the plaintiff also sent
Form 18-A which could mislead a defendant into believing that nothing is re-
quired regardless of whether the defendant is an inhabitant of the state or not.
The result in Picon is justifiable only because the defendants moved to quash
service and thus were not misled.
139. E.g., Scarton v. Charles, 115 F.R.D. 567, 570 (E.D. Mich. 1987); Pittsburgh Termi-
nal Corp. v. Mid Allegheny Corp., 110 F.R.D. 4, 7 (S.D.W. Va. 1985).
140. Compare Scarton v. Charles, 115 F.R.D. 567, 570 (E.D. Mich. 1987)(election of ser-
vice under federal rules precludes switch to state law); Pittsburgh Terminal
Corp. v. Mid Allegheny Corp., 110 F.R.D. 4, 7 (S.D.W. Va. 1985)(same); Billy v.
Ashland Oil Inc., 102 F.R.D. 230, 233-34 (W.D. Pa. 1984)(same) and FDIC v. Sims,
100 F.R.D. 792, 794 (N.D. Ala. 1984)(same) with Humana, Inc. v. Jacobson, 804
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It is easy to see how courts requiring personal service came to their
conclusions. The statutory language seems clear on its face, even if
the result is somewhat strange. However, this conclusion is illogical
and not required by the rule.
As noted above, most courts have taken the position that mailing
without a return of the acknowledgment does not constitute effective
service--even for statute of limitations purposes. If that is so, then
such service should be treated as a nullity. At that point, the plaintiff
should be free to use any other method of service allowed by Rule 4,
including state law. This will not contravene Congressional intent.
Congress was concerned that mail service alone would not provide ad-
equate guarantees of notice. Thus, it required a follow-up.
On the other hand, Congress did not eliminate former Rule 4(d)(7)
(now renumbered as Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i)) which allows the use of any
state law method of service including certified mail. Congress evi-
dently believed that state methods, even if more liberal than the fed-
eral mail service provisions, provided sufficient assurances of notice.
Notably, Congress rejected the Supreme Court's proposed amendment
which would have allowed mail service only in accordance with fed-
eral procedures. It is reasonable to conclude that allowing subsequent
state law service does not damage the statutory scheme.
Moreover, the problem addressed in Armco is not present in these
cases. In Armco, the court was concerned that the federal acknowl-
edgment form gave the defendants reason to believe that if the ac-
knowledgment was not signed there would be no penalty other than
payment of the cost of alternative service. If such alternative service
is made by means other than personal service, defendants cannot
claim they were misled. The acknowledgment form does not indicate
what kind of alternative service will be forthcoming, only that some-
thing more is required before a default judgment can be entered. Ser-
vice pursuant to state law satisfies this requirement.
It must be noted, however, that the use of state law forces the court
to treat unacknowledged mail service as ineffective, at least for Rule
12(b)(5) purposes.141 State law methods are not permissible follow-
F.2d 1390,1393 (5th Cir. 1986) (service pursuant to state law still permissable) and
Pascalides v. Irwin Yacht Sales N., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 298, 301 (D.R.I. 1988) (same).
Cf. Picon v. Sutar Beach Condominiums No. 1 Homeowners Ass'n, CIV 1987/29
(D.V.I. April 14, 1988)(allowing improper service under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) to be
deemed proper service under Virgin Islands law).
141. Rule 12(b)(5) deals with motion-, for improper service of process. FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(5). It may be reasonable to treat unacknowledged mail service as sufficient
to toll the statute of limitations in states that require service to toll the statute as
long as they do not require proper service to toll. See supra text accompanying
notes 60-64. If "proper" service is required to toll the limitations period, then a
proper follow-up service using Rule 4(d)(1) or (3) should suffice to make the mail
service proper. Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) should read as a whole, making the follow-up
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ups to mail service as a substitute for the acknowledgment because the
rule is very specific on the allowable modes of follow-up; only the
methods provided by Rules 4(d)(1) and (d)(3) are permitted. State law
only provides an alternative method of service once it is clear that ser-
vice by mail will not be effective.142
A contrary conclusion can lead to absurd results as illustrated by
Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Mid Allegheny Corp.143 In this case the
plaintiff (from Pennsylvania) sued several Virginia residents in a West
Virginia federal court. 44 When service by mail was not acknowl-
edged, the plaintiffs served the Secretary of State of West Virginia
pursuant to state law.145 However, the court found the federal mail
service ineffective because the acknowledgment forms were never re-
turned.4 6 Furthermore, the court held that once mail service was at-
tempted, resort to state methods was not allowed.4 7 Finally, the
court stated that the plaintiffs could not serve the defendants person-
ally to complete the service because extraterritorial service by mail
was not valid.148 Thus, the plaintiffs were left without a valid method
of serving process, a fact recognized by the court. 49 Clearly, such a
situation is not rational and should not be fostered by a technical in-
terpretation of the rules.1So
IV. CONCLUSION
Rule 4 should be amended to eliminate the confusion and litigation
that has surfaced to date.' 5 ' Such amendments should clarify when
service is deemed "made" under the Rule. Any amendments should
expressly permit extraterritorial use of mail service. Furthermore,
the follow-up procedures should be amended; if state law methods are
allowed to begin with, they should be permissible follow-up proce-
dures as well. The availability of attorneys' fees, including those for
making a motion for costs, should be written into an amended follow-
up procedure.
service a part of "proper" service under the rule just as a returned acknowledg-
ment would be.
142. Pascalides v. Irwin Yacht Sales N., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 298 (D.R.I. 1988).
143. 110 F.R.D. 4 (S.D.W. Va. 1985).
144. The circumstances leading to the suit are not explained in the opinion.
145. 110 F.R.D. 4, 5 (S.D.W. Va. 1985)(citing W. VA. CODE § 56-3-33 (Cum. Supp. 1985)).
146. Id. at 5.
147. Id. at 7 (citing Armco, Inc. v. Penrod-Stauffer Bldg. Sys., 733 F.2d 1087, 1089 (4th
Cir. 1984)).
148. Id. at 7-8; see generally supra text accompanying notes 103-131.
149. 110 F.R.D. 4, 8 (S.D.W. Va. 1985).
150. Indeed, in Scarton v. Charles, 115 F.R.D. 567 (E.D. Mich. 1987), the court faced a
smilar situation and came to the opposite conclusion. Id. at 571. Accord FDIC v.
Mount Vernon Ranch, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 496 (W.D. Mo. 1988); Southern Pride, Inc.
v. Turbo Tek Enters., 117 F.R.D. 566 (M.D.N. Car. 1987).
151. Some useful suggestions are made in Sinclair, supra note 6.
[Vol. 67:289
19881 SERVICE BY MAIL 317
In the meantime, the suggestions made here for interpreting the
current rule can alleviate some of the inequities while carrying out the
intent of Congress in passing these amendments. Though it is not wise
to ignore the clear language of the Rule as was done in Morse, neither
is it wise to be simplistic in interpreting the Rule under the guise of
"clear language." When more than one interpretation is reasonably
available, courts should opt for the interpretation that fosters substan-
tial justice without interfering with the overall scheme of the Rule.
